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h<^ƉĂĐĞWŽůŝĐǇ ?ƌĞǆŝƚ PsŽǇĂŐĞŝŶƚŽƚŚĞhŶŬŶŽǁŶ 
 
Dr Christopher J. Newman, University of Sunderland 
 
Introduction 
 
The United Kingdom is currently undergoing a period of dramatic and unpredictable political 
change. The result of the referendum on membership of the European Union (EU) has provided 
the political order of the UK with the greatest challenge in living memory. Uncertainty pervades 
every aspect of British political life as the economic, political and social impact of the British 
exit (Brexit) from the EU starts to become a reality. This discussion will provide insight into the 
web of constitutional and treaty issues which will impact upon the UK Space industry and 
examine some of the potential challenges and opportunities for UK Space activity, presented 
by Brexit.  
 
UK Space Activity: An Overview. 
 
UK space activity, as considered herein, is almost exclusively (though not entirely) 
concentrated on civilian applications in space, especially focusing on Earth Observation and 
Navigation applications. Civilian space activity within the UK is coordinated on a national level 
by the UK Space Agency (UKSA), which is an executive agency within the UK Government 
Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS). It was established in 2011 to provide 
leadership for, and foster the growth of, ƚŚĞh<ƐƉĂĐĞƐĞĐƚŽƌ ?ĐĐŽƌĚŝŶŐh<^ ?ƐŽǁŶĨŝŐures, 
the value of the UK space sector worth around £11.3 billion annually to the UK economy. The 
UKSA is looking to increase this to £19 billion by 2019/20 and ultimately aims to treble the 
current annual turnover to £40 billion by 2030. This prediction however, was predicated on 
the maintenance of the existing treaty relationships with other European nations. Despite the 
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optimism within the UKSA about continued involvement in European space projects, a 
fundamental question that needs to be addressed, therefore, in respect of the UK Space 
industry is the extent to which that strong engagement will be possible given Brexit.  
 
It is not just at governmental level where there is recognition of the collaborative and co-
dependent nature of UK space activity. UKspace, the national trade association for the 
commercial space sector, has written to the UK government and reminded them that an exit 
from the EU is potentially disruptive to the nascent commercial space activity of UK firms. The 
UK has carved a significant niche in the design and manufacture of small satellites with firms 
such as SSTL (Surrey Satellite Technology Limited) and Airbus Defence and Space UK leading 
this renaissance in UK space manufacturing. The challenges of exiting the EU for such firms are 
clear, with other, European manufacturers (such as Thales Alenia) poised to step into lucrative 
EU funded space projects should UK firms become frozen out of EU funded space projects 
following Brexit.  
 
UK, ESA and the shadow of the EU 
 
It is impossible to consider the UK space sector without examining the position of the UK within 
the European Space Agency (ESA). ESA is an intergovernmental agency comprising 22 member 
states and was founded in 1975. According to the UKSA corporate plan [Available 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/uk-space-agency-corporate-plan-2016-2017] 
the UK contributes around £300 million to ESA, which represents over three quarters of the 
total UK space budget. ESA is an independent treaty organisation, legally distinct from the EU, 
but undoubtedly there is a a significant interrelationship between the two organisations, with 
the EU providing around 20% of the total ESA budget.  
 
dŚĞƌĞĐĞŶƚŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚƉƵďůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶ ‘^ĂƚĞůůŝƚĞƐĂŶĚ^ƉĂĐĞ P'ŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚƌĞƐƉŽŶƐĞƚŽƚŚĞ,ŽƵƐĞ
ŽĨ ŽŵŵŽŶƐ ^ĐŝĞŶĐĞ  ? dĞĐŚŶŽůŽŐǇ ŽŵŵŝƚƚĞĞ ?Ɛ dŚŝƌĚ ZĞƉŽƌƚ ŽĨ ^ĞƐƐŝŽŶ
 ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201617/cmselect/cmsctech/830/830
.pdf contained explicit commitment to membership of ESA despite Brexit. The report stated 
that membership of ESA remains a central tenant of the UK space strategy. The level of this 
commitment was underlined at the recent ESA Council of Ministers in Lucerne, Switzerland 
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where the government minister responsible for overseeing space activity in the UK, Jo Johnson 
MP, produced a strong statement of intent to accompany the financial guarantees. In his 
statement to the ESA Council of Ministers, [ see 
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/speech-from-science-minister-jo-johnson-at-the-
esa-ministerial] he reaffirmed the UK commitment to European cooperation on science 
programmes, emphasised the commercial investments in collaborative projects and especially 
Navigation, Earth observation and the ExoMars project.  
 
Ultimately, however, it is the financial contributions to ESA which will be the decisive metric 
ǁŚĞŶĐŽŶƐŝĚĞƌŝŶŐƚŚĞh< ?ƐĚĞƐŝƌĞƚŽƌĞŵĂŝŶǁŝƚŚŝŶƚŚĞƵƌŽƉĞĂŶƐƉĂĐĞĐŽŵŵƵŶŝƚy post-Brexit. 
Underpinning the statement of Jo Johnson, are the contributions of the UK government to ESA. 
Through the UKSA, the UK will provide  ? ? ? ?ďŝůůŝŽŶŽǀĞƌƚŚĞŶĞǆƚĨŝǀĞǇĞĂƌƐƚŽĂǀĂƌŝĞƚǇŽĨ^
projects (the exact breakdown can be found here https://www.gov.uk/government/news/uk-
commits-to-european-collaboration-on-science-and-exploration-satellite-technology-and-
services) equating to just under 14% of the total ESA budget. As reflected in the ministerial 
statement, a large part of this contribution is directed towards integrated applications, Earth 
Observation and navigation  ? this is unsurprising given that these are the areas upon which 
the UK space manufacturing business is at its strongest.  
  
The Galileo Conundrum 
 
The UK Government are keen to emphasise a sustained commitment to investing in European 
projects. Yet nowhere are the difficulties posed by Brexit more prevalent than when 
considering the most high-profile of these: the  ? ? ?ďŝůůŝŽŶ'ĂůŝůĞŽƐĂƚĞůůŝƚĞŶĂǀŝŐĂƚŝŽŶƐǇƐƚĞŵ ?
a project funded entirely by the EU. Launched in 2003, and as per Reg. 1 of the GNSS Regulation 
1285/2013 of the European Parliament and the Council, the Galileo and Copernicus Satellite 
programmes will establish the first global satellite navigation and global positioning 
infrastructure specifically designed for civilian purposes. UKspace have estimated that the 
potentiaůŵĂƌŬĞƚĨŽƌ'ĂůŝůĞŽĂŶĚƌĞůĂƚĞĚĂƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐĂŶĚƐĞƌǀŝĐĞĐŽƵůĚďĞĂƌŽƵŶĚ ? ?ďŝůůŝŽŶďǇ
2025 [see https://www.ft.com/content/48e12b28-5e2d-11e6-bb77-a121aa8abd95]. With the 
EU providing the funding and most ESA members also being EU member states, post-Brexit, 
the funding for Galileo and associated lucrative contracts may be funnelled through EU 
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member states within ESA which would have a significant impact upon UK space 
manufacturing.  
 
The UK has significant input into the Galileo programme, with SSTL providing a significant 
contribution as prime contractor for navigation payloads. Given that, until formal notification 
is given, the UK is still an EU member state, these existing commitments will remain in place. 
As stated above, however it is inevitable that non-UK, European firms are already positioning 
themselves to replace SSTL, once the UK ceases to be a member of the EU. The damage to the 
UK government goals of trebling the UK space economy by 2030 has the potential to be 
significant if UK involvement in the manufacturing phase of the Galileo programme is not 
retained. 
 
It is not just access to the manufacturing of Galileo and Copernicus hardware that may be 
limited post-Brexit. Whilst the rudimentary services afforded by the Galileo programme are 
designed to be available for free use, the more precise, securely-encrypted Public Regulated 
Service (PRS), the marquee service offered by Galileo, is presently limited to EU member states 
(as per Regulation 42 of the GNSS Regulation 1285/2013). The UK is seeking to align itself with 
the utilisation of space-based applications through the exploitation of data obtained from 
space and exclusion from PRS capability would have a further negative impact upon the UK 
space sector. The GNSS regulations do allow for non-EU members to gain access to PRS data 
and capabilities. For post-Brexit UK, this access will be subject to negotiations. Any such 
negotiations will not occur in isolation and, as will be seen later, there will inevitably be a cost 
associated with such access. Once Article 50 is activated (the legal mechanism contained within 
the Treaty of European Union, by which the UK formally gives notification of its intention to 
leave the EU) the price of PRS access will undoubtedly be a financial premium, but also may 
become a bargaining chip leveraged against access to other services.  
 
Beyond the Horizon: Research & Development Post-Brexit 
 
Beyond the specifics of individual programmes, there is yet more uncertainty when 
contemplating the impact of Brexit upon the wider research and development needed for a 
sustainable space industry within the UK. The free movement of European citizens around 
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member states is one of the founding principles of the EU. It was concerns around this, and 
over unfettered immigration that have been touted as one of the key factors behind the 
decision of those who chose to vote leave. Yet, a third of the UK space workforce comes from 
overseas and restrictions on free movement of persons may have a significantly chilling effect 
on space research both directly affecting the space industry and more broadly within UK 
Universities.  
 
In addition, the UK has been a beneficiary of the funding made available by the EU for Research 
and Development in the space sector. The UK government has pledged to underwrite any 
shortfall in funding on science research, including the Horizon 2020 programme which has 
significant funds allocated for research into space-based technology. This was welcomed by 
the science community, but disquiet is still expressed in relation to R & D funding beyond 
Brexit. The UK government has indicated that there will be significant funding for R & D post-
Brexit, but details have remained sketchy and, given the political and fiscal uncertainty that the 
triggering of Article 50 will undoubtedly bring, there is no sense of how this will manifest itself 
once the existing funding streams dry up. 
 
Opportunities and ƚŚĞ ‘,ĂƌĚ ?Žƌ ‘^ŽĨƚ ?KƉƚŝŽŶ 
 
This ƵŶĐĞƌƚĂŝŶƚǇ ƚĞŶĚƐ ƚŽ ůĞĂĚ ƚŽƐŽŵĞǁŚĂƚ ƉĞƐƐŝŵŝƐƚŝĐ ƉƌĞĚŝĐƚŝŽŶƐ ŽĨ ƚŚĞ h< ?Ɛ ƉŽƐƚ-Brexit 
economy. This should not mask the fact that there are opportunities whereby growth in the 
UK space sector can be promoted. First, and most obvious, is the continued involvement with 
ESA and the benefits afforded from greater collaboration in space-based research. Recently 
ESA Director General, Jan Woerner, stated that post-Brexit, he did not envisage a change in 
the UK role within ESA. Whilst the rest of the UK economy faces significant challenges, the 
space sector does at least have the anchor of ESA to provide a multi-lateral arrangement 
through which involvement in collaborative projects can be fostered. Indeed, it may be that 
ESA and the entire space sector takes on added importance within the post-Brexit UK industrial 
landscape.  
 
It is difficult to accurately predict other opportunities that exist without knowing the nature of 
ƚŚĞh< ?ƐĞǆŝƚĨƌŽŵƚŚĞh ?dŚĞƌĞŚĂǀĞďĞĞŶŶƵŵĞƌŽƵƐsuggestŝŽŶƐĂƐƚŽǁŚĂƚƚŚĞh< ?ƐƚƌĂĚŝŶŐ
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relationship with the rest of the world will look like (see for example 
http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/brexit01.pdf ) and each one of these would establish a 
dramatically different trajectory for the UK economy. The options range from Ă ‘,ĂƌĚ ?ƌĞǆŝƚ
 ?ƚŚĂƚŝƐĐŽŵƉůĞƚĞĚŝƐĞŶŐĂŐĞŵĞŶƚĨƌŽŵƚŚĞhĂŶĚƚŚĞŝ^ŶŐůĞDĂƌŬĞƚ ?ƚŚƌŽƵŐŚƚŽĂ ‘^ŽĨƚ ?ƌĞǆŝƚ
(whereby the UK leaves the EU but retains access to the single market and membership of the 
European Economic Area).  
 
Each of these options present different opportunities and challenges. Until the formal 
ĂĐƚŝǀĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƌƚŝĐůĞ ? ?ĂŶĚŶŽƚŝĨŝĐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞh< ?ƐŝŶƚĞŶƚŝŽŶƚŽůĞĂǀĞƚŚĞ EU, it is not certain 
ǁŚŝĐŚŽƉƚŝŽŶƚŚĞh<ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚǁŝůůƐĞĞŬƚŽĂĚŽƉƚ ?dŚĞ ‘ƐŽĨƚ ?ƌĞǆŝƚŽƉƚŝŽŶǁŝůůƵŶĚŽƵďƚĞĚůǇ
be the most warmly received by the financial markets and will likely have the least economic 
impact (although there will undoubtedly still bĞƐŽŵĞĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐƚƌĂƵŵĂ ? ?dŚĞ ‘ŚĂƌĚ ?ƌĞǆŝƚǁŝůů
be the most unpredictable and yet may well afford the greatest opportunities for the 
establishment of new trading relationships and economic policies that are both flexible enough 
to encourage new trading arrangements while still enjoying a relationship with the EU.  
 
Conclusion: The Dark before the Dawn? 
 
Unpicking the UK from its intricate relationship with the EU is arguably the single biggest 
challenge the UK and international law has faced since the end of the Second World War. The 
impact of Brexit upon UK space activity is a small, but significant aspect of the much bigger 
challenges facing the UK. At first sight, the UK space industry does have some insulation, given 
the pre-existing relationship with ESA and the avowed intention of the UK government to 
continue to fund UK Space activity. Until Article 50 is activated, however, and the formal 
process of a negotiated exit from the EU begins, there is no clear model upon which to base 
any predictions. Brexit may present some unparalleled opportunities for forging new, dynamic 
and hitherto impossible trading and technology-transfer relationships. Equally, Brexit may 
fatally weaken the nascent UK space industry, robbing it of access to key collaborative projects, 
Z ?ĨƵŶĚŝŶŐĂŶĚĐĂƵƐŝŶŐĂ ‘ďƌĂŝŶĚƌĂŝŶ ?ŽĨƚŽƉƐƉĂĐĞƚĂůĞŶƚ ?dŚĞƌĞĂůŝƚǇŝƐ ?ƵŶƚŝůƚŚĞŐĞŶŝĞŽĨ
Brexit is out of the bottle, the only certainty is more uncertainty. 
 
